China-Pakistan Strategic Maneuver: India’s Response

Ghulam Mohi Din Naikoo
Research Scholar,
Centre for South and Central Asian Studies,
Central University of Punjab,
Bathinda, Punjab, India;
and is the corresponding author.
E-mail: mohiudinps@gmail.com

Hafiz Mohammad Iqram Ul Haq
Student,
Department of the Political Science,
Central University of Punjab,
Bathinda, Punjab, India. E-mail: uikram941@gmail.com

China-Pakistan relation stands out as one of the few enduring friendships in the 21st century, regardless of different belief systems and cultures. Since the beginning of their relationship, both countries have taken countless steps to solidify this strategic relationship. Beijing and Islamabad never had any major strains in their bilateral relations. The relationship is mostly based on strategic and geopolitical interests. The journey of Beijing and Islamabad relationship began in the 1950s when Pakistan recognized the People’s Republic of China. During the last seven decades, China has overtaken the United States as the largest arms supplier and reliable partner of Pakistan. Beijing has assisted in the military, economic and strategic fields, while Islamabad extended its support on international issues like its position in the United Nations and human rights issues. In the recent times, both countries have signed several important agreements and deals to further the engagement like OBOR project which will be deepening their strategic relationship. These developments have raised concerns among India’s leadership. Consequently, New Delhi adopted counter- strategies. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘Act East’ and ‘Neighborhood First’ policies are to draw down the China-Pakistan strategic outburst.

Introduction

One of the developments during the first decades of the 21st century is China-Pakistan all-weather and time-tested friendship. The relationship has withstood the vicissitudes of domestic, regional and global developments. ‘Give and take’ is considered as the unique pillar of this strategic relations—both the countries have stood by each other in time of trials, tribulations, and crises, and the relationship is based on reciprocity, equality, and non-interference in internal affairs.

Beijing and Islamabad’s relationship reached new heights during the last few decades. China has initiated several new projects since the last decade which are beneficial for Pakistan’s economic growth and stability, while Pakistan welcomed it to get strategic leverage over India by these projects.

China-Pakistan strategic cooperation is considered as an important relationship in world politics. The diplomatic relation between the two countries was established on May 21, 1951. Pakistan was among the first Muslim country to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) following the communist takeover. In 1960, China faced international isolation. In 1961, Sino-Pak relationship received a boost when Pakistan voted in favor of a bill concerning the restoration of China’s legitimate rights in the UN. The Sino-India war in 1962 provided further opportunities for the Sino-Pakistan cooperation and both countries signed their first trade agreement in 1963 followed by diplomatic exchanges. The Sino-Pak strategic relationship was established in 1972 and both the nations celebrated the 60th anniversary of their diplomatic relations in 2011.

The strategic relationship between these two countries was further strengthened in the last decade when China announced several projects like Sino-Pakistan economic corridor, one-belt, and one-road. Pakistan welcomed all these projects in order to counter the Indian threat. It has been analyzed that the driving force behind Pakistan is not just love towards China, but a strategic move to counter India and amplify geostrategic power.

In response to these projects, India criticized the setting up of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC ) and decided to skip the much-publicized One-Belt, One-Road (OBOR) forum in Beijing. The Indian leadership strongly criticized the CPEC project because it passes through Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK) which is a disputed area between India and Pakistan. According to India, the Belt and Road initiative is a bad deal that undermines India’s core interests. Consequently, the Modi government took many initiatives to counter the Sino-Pakistan strategic relationship.

OBOR as a Strategic Calculus

China’s President Xi Jinping took the most ambitious foreign and economic policy in the name of Belt and Road by which he tried to strengthen its economic leadership in the neighboring regions. Further, the initiative leads to economic integration, free flow of trade and services, other commercial and economic activities besides promoting people-to-people connectivity. In the 21st century, geo-economic, geo-political, geo-strategic aspects are dominating international politics.¹

The project involves infrastructure building, investment, and trade. The leadership is trying to use the OBOR as a platform to handle huge domestic production. Further, the project will help China to address regional disparities and help spur development in the underdeveloped hinterland and rustbelt.² Some scholars state that another aspect of the construction of OBOR is to revive the old trading routes and search for new trading routes and partners covering across several regions. The rapid economic rise of China over the last few decades has been spectacular and its aspiration of global leadership is an important feature of the 21st century. Beijing’s leadership wants to turn out to be a revisionist power or a revolutionary power. The leadership of China announced the OBOR policy as an important initiative to connect different regions of the world through land route and maritime silk route.³

The OBOR was proposed by the Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to the central Asian countries in 2013. The initiative calls for the integration of Chinese land-locked regions by building infrastructure, increasing cultural exchanges, and broadening trade. Through the OBOR project, President Xi Jinping proposed establishing a modern network of railways, roads, pipelines, and utility grids that would link China and Central Asia, West Asia, and parts of South Asia. The same year, President Xi Jinping announced building of the Maritime Silk road during his visit to Indonesia. The main rationale behind this strategy is to create the world’s largest platform for economic cooperation, trade, financing, collaboration, and social and cultural cooperation.⁴

In the last 30 years, China has made tremendous growth. However, several other reasons were of concern to the Beijing leadership like the geographical location, resource endowment, and foundation of different infrastructural projects. Consequently, OBOR would help China to boost development of the lagging regions of the east and slower development of the west and strong development of the coastal areas and weak development of the islands. Further, it will lead to the allround development of 4.4 billion population at an aggregate of US$21 tn.⁵

Academic discussions and debates took place regarding Chinese pragmatic approach to OBOR. Some academicians opined that Beijing would try to replicate the original ‘silk road’ because there was a theory behind the Chinese vision of belt and road policy such as Mackinder “Heartland theory”. The proposed plan was based on two projects like the 21st century Maritime Silk Route and the other initiative ‘the Silk Road’, ‘Economic Belt’. According to the Chinese government, these projects will boost economic growth by exporting its capital and technology globally. The projects will give China an opportunity to reshape the economic and security architecture of several regions of Asia, Africa and Europe.⁶

Another aspect of OBOR is to understand the geopolitical realities of mutual trust and reduce barriers in order to enhance regional cooperation. After announcing the OBOR vision, many referred to it as a ‘strategy’ to serve its national interest. Further, it was thought that Beijing wanted to re-evaluate the new round of policies to promote foreign trade in different regions as it was faced with opportunities and challenges in the open economy. Another school of thought believes that Sir Halford Mackinder’s ‘Heartland’ theory (as proposed by him in 1904, in his book, The Geographical Pivot of History) is a driving force behind the OBOR policy of China. The primary focus of OBOR is to rearrange the power equation in Eurasia. In his proposition, Mackinder had stated that whoever controls Eastern Europe will dominate the world. The above argument is vindicated by Prabhat P Shukla in his article “Understanding the Chinese One-Belt-One-Road in 2015”:

“The part that is most quoted is the proposition that the dominant power in East Europe ‘or Eurasia, or the Pivot Area—these expressions are not coterminous’ would dominate the Heartland ‘or the Euro-Asia continent’, and would, in turn, dominate the world. This is clearly wrong, and a hundred years of history after the piece appeared to bear witness to this reality: the USSR dominated the pivot area, but did not succeed in dominating the world.”⁷

Another angle of the proposed OBOR is viewed as a counter move by Beijing against the US’s advancement in the Asia-Pacific region. The US declared that Washington is ready to initiate the ‘New Silk Road’ to engage Central Asian, South Asian and some European countries with India to maintain the Asian power structure under their influence. Earlier, the erstwhile US President Obama had stated that the US cannot allow China to decide trade rules in the Asia-Pacific region as the US has trading partners in the region. The above statement is further vindicated by Hillary Clinton in her speech when she mentioned about the ‘New Silk Road’, in Chennai, India in 2011. Fallon⁸ wrote:

Hillary Clinton first referred publicly to her vision of a “New Silk Road,” in a speech in Chennai, India on July 20, 2011. Chinese officials were flummoxed to find that she used the term Silk Road to describe a US policy. According to one Chinese diplomat, when the US initiated this we were devastated. We had long sleepless nights. And after two years, President Xi proposed a strategic vision of four new concepts of Silk Road.⁹

Consequently, China initiated the OBOR project against the interests of the US and other world powers. However, the other regional countries view OBOR as a strategic project to enhance dominance in the neighborhood. Further, the project undermines endogenous dynamics and the normative value that it carries for going beyond Western-centric approaches to international relations.¹⁰ So, the neighboring countries hesitate to join the OBOR project. These views of the neighboring countries concern the Chinese leadership. Consequently, Beijing’s foreign minister Wang Yi felt obliged to reject geopolitical stipulations by stating that the OBOR is “the product of inclusive cooperation not a tool of geopolitics.”¹¹

The OBOR has two separate projects: land-based Silk Road economic belt and sea-based Maritime Silk Road. These two projects have several small projects like the country to country corridors to encourage regional connectivity. By these big and small projects, Beijing wants to play an important role in global affairs and build a Beijing-centered trade network.

Maritime Silk Route

The proposed OBOR passes through Central Asia, West Asia, the Middle East, and Europe as these countries are situated on the original Silk Road. Through Maritime Silk Road (MSR) project, Beijing has approached several Western Pacific and Indian Ocean countries, particularly those who are strategically located. The main strategy behind MSR is not military dominance but purely an economic agenda. The MSR helps China to engage the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific countries to enhance sea trade connectivity by developing ports and other industrial infrastructural zones of the hinterland.¹²

The academicians and scholars opine that several relatively new concepts and discourse on MSR are still evolving. The MSR will create a unipolar world and enhance China’s new security architecture to counter US dominance with the help and support of regional countries. However, India and its strategic partner the US oppose the Chinese OBOR project for several economic and strategic reasons. The Indian leadership strongly criticized OBOR because it passes through the disputed territory of India and Pakistan. Besides, New Delhi views OBOR as a strategic move to encircle India by constructing ports and road links in its neighborhood. The Indian reaction to OBOR was evident when its delegates did not attend the meeting. The official statement provided was that “No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.” At the same time, at the Raisina Dialogue held in 2017, the Indian foreign secretary S Jaishankar articulated, “China is very sensitive about its sovereignty. The economic corridor passes through an illegal territory, an area that we call Pak-occupied Kashmir. You can imagine India’s reaction to the fact that such a project has been initiated without consulting us.” The above statement was reinforced by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi when he stated “connectivity in itself cannot override or undermine the sovereignty of other nations.”¹³

The Indian leadership expressed strategic concern over the OBOR that would get China economic leverage, which would in turn increase its geopolitical leverage and, in doing so, intensify security concern for India. Further, this project gives Beijing a foothold in the western Indian Ocean, especially through the Gwadar port and on the eastern side by Hambantota and Chittagong ports. The Indian leadership claimed that through this port development, China strategically encircles India and would maintain trade dominance in the region. Beijing would deploy its naval force in these ports and halt all trade and oil transportation during an emergency.¹⁴

Land-Based Silk Road

Through the land-based Silk Road, Beijing would like to initiate connectivity of different regions of South Asia, West Asia, Central Asia and Europe. China proposed an investment plan and going global with this connectivity program. There are five corridors which would help Beijing to expand its economic and trade routes in these regions. With the help of these corridors, China would connect 65 countries. Through this project, Beijing wants to achieve several goals like policy coordination, facilitates connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonding.15 Some of the international relations scholars opine that China adopted a proactive foreign policy to enhance the global reach and China’s strategic move is considered as the core element of its foreign policy. Through this, Beijing is trying to expand its economic markets and secure energy routes in these regions as it has boundary disputes with India, and to counter the US's maritime dominance in the Asia-Pacific region.16 Further, it is opined that Beijing is trying to rearrange the regional power structure in their favor and use it as a soft power to achieve strategic goals.17 Also, the Chinese-dominated financial institutions like Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and BRICS are attempts to strategically replace the US financial dominance in these regions.¹⁸

According to several scholars, security is the biggest challenge raised by OBOR because it may strengthen Beijing’s position while weakening India’s strategic influence in its neighborhood and other regions. Through the OBOR, China might dominate the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf through which 90% of Indian crude oil and trade passes. China is also busy building military bases and connectivity projects through which it seeks naval access in the IOR which may serve as security and military base.¹⁹

In the last three decades, a considerable amount of speculation has arisen concerning China’s military intentions in the IOR and other regions. China’s strategic and military intentions are revolving in large part around its oversea plan of “String of Pearls”. The possible aim of China’s great grand strategy is its naval and military installations stretching across the Indian and Persian Gulf regions. Therefore, Indian leadership, worried by these military installations, due to long-term border disputes with China, has raised concerns over these naval installations posing security issues for India's sovereignty. New Delhi feels threatened by the OBOR project and its naval activities in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean and its infrastructure projects in South Asian countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Further, the Indian leadership has apparently bought the speculation that China uses MSR as an alternative term for the ‘String of Pearls’ which will assist its military encirclement of India.²⁰

India’s Response

Since the announcement of OBOR project by the Chinese leadership in 2013, the Indian government has initiated several projects that would help New Delhi to counter the rising Beijing domination. The current government has taken numerous initiatives to develop industrial capacity and other strategic programs to counter China's rising dominance in the region. Further, India initiated several joint projects with Japan and other neighboring countries to maintain the balance of power as well as with the US to secure strategic interests in IOR and other regions. The most important initiatives are mentioned below.

Neighborhood First

The 2014 general elections changed the landscape of Indian politics—the NDA formed the government under the leadership of Narendra Modi. At the time of the oath-taking ceremony, Narendra Modi invited leaders of the neighboring countries. The main strategy behind the invitation of these leaders was to focus on connectivity and reciprocal relationship with its neighbors. Therefore, the foreign minister, Sushma Swaraj chose several neighboring countries like Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka for her initial bilateral visits.

There were several logistics behind Modi's neighborhood policy or neighborhood first. The former NDA Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee once remarked, “Friends can change but not neighbors, who have to live together”. Prime Minister Narendra Modi also remarked, “A nation’s destiny is linked to its neighborhood. That is why my government has placed the highest priority on advancing friendship and cooperation with its neighbors”. Through this policy, the Modi government has given clear indication that the government is trying to achieve the objective of becoming the dominant power in Asia.²¹

The are several strategic objectives behind the ‘neighborhood first’ policy. The Modi government had initiated numerous small projects like strengthening the infrastructure connectivity, creating a business-friendly environment, reducing non-tariff barriers, boosting regional cooperation, and integrating common markets. Another aspect of ‘neighborhood first’ policy is to secure its regional surroundings because India had to face cross-border terrorism from neighboring countries like Pakistan and Nepal several times.²²

The Indian think-tank opines that the Modi government strategically initiated multilateral projects to link ‘neighborhood first’, Act East policy, Sagar-Mala,²³ Asia-Africa Growth Corridor²⁴ to enhance connectivity with regional and other countries. Paradoxically, through these initiatives, the Modi government strategically countered China’s and Pakistan ambitions to engage the neighborhood in their favor. On the basis of the ‘neighborhood first’ and Act East policy, the Modi government announced several infrastructural projects like upgrading and converting its roads into national highways, transport corridors to be linked by rail and road with several neighboring countries. Therefore, they also proposed the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation (BCIM), an economic corridor to connect with Bhutan and further into Nepal. These projects allow India and other regional countries to access overland transportation; transshipment and transit will lead to the desired deeper integration of the South Asian economy.²⁵

The ‘neighborhood first’ policy that the Modi government initiated led to multimode connectivity with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Iran and other Central Asian countries. This helped the Indian leadership to counter the setting up of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM), New Eurasian Land Bridge, China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.²⁶

Modi’s ‘neighborhood first’ encompasses more than South Asian region. The government aspired to extend its ‘neighborhood first’ policy to East Asia and West Asia. Further, ‘neighborhood first’ policy would enable India to engage the neighboring countries in several trade links and other infrastructure projects. The Indian think-tank felt that the ‘neighborhood first’ policy helped India to strategically counter China's and Pakistan’s influence, more specifically the CPEC, and also maintain the balance of power status quo.

Modi’s Act East Policy

In the recent times, the Indian government has strengthened India’s foreign policy outlook on multiple fronts. The main reason for the establishment of ‘Look East’ policy was the leadership’s stress on regional integration, rapid economic growth, reform, and liberalization, speed up the development of the backward northeastern region of India in order to transform it into a corridor for geographical proximity of regions, sub-regional cooperation. Further, they wanted to establish free trade zone in the region and Modi’s East Asian policy was to put stress on regional integration.

Since the announcement of CPEC and OBOR by the Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, the Indian leadership had raised concerns about the project. However, when Modi came to power in 2014, the new government reframed its foreign policy according to the changing environment of international politics. The newly established government tried to extend its role and influence in the East Asian region and also participated in the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting or ADMM plus. Another aspect of Act East policy was economic engagement; India has signed Free Trade Agreement with the 10 member-ASEAN which will help increase trade between India and the ASEAN countries to $70 bn. Further, the government entered into strategic partnerships with many ASEAN countries through the revival of Look East Policy to Act East policy.²⁷

The Act East policy is influenced by the earlier Look East policy by the newly established NDA government. The policy would help to pursue and nurture a strategic and economic relationship with South East and East Asian countries. Through this policy, India has entered into a nuclear deal with Japan and initiated minister-level meetings of Japan, India, and the US. India also conducted a joint naval exercise code named ‘Malabar’ with the US and also pledged greater cooperation with other East Asian countries. They signed several MoUs and agreements, but the most important of them have been the visits by naval ships, the sale of patrol boats, and continued joint exploration of oil blocks.²⁸

The first priority of Act East Asia policy was originally conceived as an economic initiative, but has gained political, strategic and cultural dimensions including establishment of institutional mechanism for dialogue and cooperation. The policy helped New Delhi to upgrade the strategic relationship with 10 East Asian countries. India has upgraded its relations to a strategic partnership with Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Singapore and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and forged close ties with all countries in the Asia-Pacific region. India has also used other regional forms such as Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to integrate with other regions for economic development.²⁹

The political pundits of India and other countries argued that the Act East policy is a reaction to China’s increasing engagement in South and East Asian countries but especially in Pakistan with some important projects like CPEC and infrastructure development of Gwadar port. Both the projects became a serious concern for India’s security and economic interests. Consequently, New Delhi initiated Act East policy to maintain relations with South East and East Asian countries and counter Sino-Pak collaboration and influence in these neighboring countries. Therefore, the Modi government announced several investment programs, financial assistance policies, and people-to-people exchange programs in the educational sector. The Act East policy also helped the Modi government to enhance trade with these regional countries. India signed a free trade agreement with Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand and has moved ahead on one with Indonesia.³⁰

Geostrategic characteristics would also condition India’s engagement with Indonesia, which is one of the most significant actors in the Indian Ocean region, an area that is increasingly witnessing greater strategic competition between China and India. A defining characteristic of the Act East policy, however, might be the emphasis on security and defense, as well as greater cooperation on combating terrorism, which is expected to become a part of India’s strategic engagement with all the major countries of Southeast Asia.³¹

The Act East policy should also improve Indian connectivity with ASEAN, particularly between Northeast India and Myanmar. Projects like the Trilateral Highway and Kaladan Multi-modal Trade Transit Project, and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) are projected to not only increase mutual economic productivity but also promote peace and prosperity in the Northeast region.³²

The Act East policy played a very significant role in Modi government’s foreign policy through which it engaged the South East and East Asian countries. The announcement of several connectivity and infrastructure projects would make India the largest trading partner of some East Asian countries. Simultaneously, the Act East policy helped the Modi government to counter the Chinese and Pakistani influence in the region.

Sagar Mala and Asia Africa Growth Corridor

The rising influence of Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean and other regions by developing ports and also road connectivity with its industrial hub areas is to develop connectivity among different countries and erode the disparities between lagging and leading regions. However, the policy pundits of India view these projects suspiciously as a strategic encirclement by the Chinese navy around India’s strategic locations. Consequently, the Modi government took two strategic steps, “Sagar Mala and Asia Africa Growth Corridor”, to counter China. According to the Modi government, this project is a strategic component to counter the network building across the borders of Beijing.33 China is also busy in constructing the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to get access to the Indian Ocean from both the east and west of India.³⁴

The Sagar Mala project was initiated by the Modi government in 2016 to cover 13 states on a 5300-km stretch, starting from eastern India (Gujarat) to Arunachal Pradesh and ending across the Indo-Myanmar border of Manipur and Mizoram, involving an expenditure of 12-14,000 cr during a five-year timeframe. In fact, the Sagar Mala project was announced by the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2003, but it remained in limbo during the UPA tenure until it was revived again under the Modi government. Through the Sagar Mala/Bharat Mala project, the Modi government made an attempt to improve connectivity with Myanmar and Thailand via road and extended its maritime connectivity to other ASEAN countries.³⁵

The main strategic goal of the Modi government behind the Sagar Mala project is to counter the OBOR on the one hand and try to isolate Pakistan at international level. The major hindrance to Modi’s foreign policy is China’s attempts to block India’s effort in naming Pakistan as a terrorism-sponsoring country and also Beijing’s efforts to block India’s bid for a full membership into the nuclear supplier’s group. Consequently, Modi government has put primary focus on regional countries like Bhutan-Bangladesh-Nepal-India road connectivity agreements to snub Pakistan and China at the same time.³⁶

The Modi government has taken another initiative called Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) to counter the CPEC and OBOR projects of China. With the support of Japan, the Modi government made an attempt to create a free and open Indo-Pacific region to link up the African continent with India and countries in South-Asia and South East Asia. According to pundits, India and Japan strategically use AAGC as a counter move to China’s OBOR and CPEC initiatives. The Modi government has accused China of undermining India’s sovereignty through the CPEC with the help of Pakistan. Consequently, Modi and Abe made a joint statement to kickstart an Asia-Africa Growth Corridor to counter the rising Chinese dominance in Asia and Africa region. Both the leaders stated that Asia-Africa growth corridor benefited various stakeholders in the India-Pacific region.³⁷

Conclusion

In the contemporary times, Asia has become an important factor in the global economy. Academicians have called the 21st century an Asian century due to the rapid economic growth of the two Asian giants. The great powers continuously tried to ally with the Asian countries for economic and security interests. However, the border disputes among the regional countries make it volatile for security and peace of the world. In spite of these setbacks to regional peace, the countries have made several efforts to develop understanding and connectivity between the people.

Post 2010, China has announced several maritime and land route connectivity projects to expand its regional and extra-regional connectivity such as CPEC, OBOR, and BCIM corridors. The leadership of China stated that these projects will give a boost to the economic growth and will help maintain peace and security in areas where these corridors pass through. However, countries like India, Japan, and the US are openly opposed to these projects. The leadership of these countries argue that OBOR will enable China to dominate these regions both economically and politically. Therefore, through this project, Beijing will also dominate the sea lines of the Indian and Pacific oceans. At the same time, the Indian leadership claimed that the CPEC violates India’s sovereignty because it passes through the disputed territory of PoK. On the other hand, Maritime Silk Road is an encirclement policy by which China encircles India by developing ports in the Indian Ocean.

The Modi government took strong initiatives to counter the Sino-Pak strategic maneuver. It took ample foreign policy measures like ‘neighborhood first’, Act East Policy, and Sagar Mala projects to maintain connectivity with different countries and also develop road linkages with other neighboring countries to encourage economic growth on the one hand and counter Sino-Pak strategic and economic encirclement. Therefore, the Modi government has recently taken up the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor in collaboration with Japan. Tokyo has decided to invest in the port development of different Asian and African countries in collaboration with New Delhi. The result of these projects is a clear indication that India has strategically countered both China and Pakistan at the same time.

1. B K Sharma (2016), China’s One Belt One Road: Initiative, Challenges and Prospective, Vij Books, Delhi.
2. Peter Cia (2017), “Understanding China’s Belt and Analysis”, pp. 1-12. Retrieved from https://www.lowyinstitute.org. Accessed on September 30, 2017.
3. D Banerjee (2016), “China’s One Belt One Road Initiative – An Indian Perspective”, Yusof Ishak Institute Share Their Understanding of Current, Vol. 1, No. 14, pp. 1-10. Retrieved from https://www.iseas.edu.sg
4. Tian Jinchen (2016), “One Belt and One Road: Connecting China and the World”, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-insights/one-belt-and-one-road-connecting-china-and-the-world. Retrieved on September 22, 2017.
5. Sharma (2016), op. cit.
6. K G Cai (2015), “China’s Foreign Policy Adjustment Under Xi Jinping”, China’s World, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 30-56.
7. P P Shukla (2015), “Understanding the Chinese One-Belt-One-Road”, Vivekananda International Foundation, pp. 1-28.
8. Theresa Fallon (2015), “The New Silk Road: Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy for Eurasia, American Foreign Policy Interests”, The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57c1e6325016e1eb7935512b/t/57f68f49d482e94753 c3dcf2/1475776345207/FallonNewSilkRoad-5.pdf. Accessed on September 24, 2017.
9. Ibid., p. 141.
10. http://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/understanding-the-Chinese-one-belt-one-road.pdf
11. L S Yu Cheng (2017), The Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Arena: Chinese and European Perspectives, Springer, London. Retrieved from https://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9789811059209. Accessed on September 28, 2017.
12. J C Vijay Sakhuja (2016), China’s Maritime Silk Road and Asia, Published by Vij Books India Pvt Ltd., New Delhi.
13. H V Pant (2017), India Challenges China’s Intentions on One Belt, One Road Initiative, June 11. Retrieved from https://yaleglobal.yale.edu: https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/india-challenges-chinas-intentions-one-belt-one-road-initiative
14. Ibid.
15. R G Zhou (2017), “The Silk Road Economic Belt, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung”, pp. 1-76. Retrieved from https://www.sipri.org/publications/2017/other-publications/silk-road-economic-belt. Accessed on September 26, 2017.
16. A Bhattacharya (2017), Journeys on the Silk Road Through Ages—Romance, Legend, Reality, Zorba Books, New Delhi.
17. S Tiezzi S (2014), China’s ‘New Silk Road’ Vision Revealed: A New Series in Xinhua Offers the Clearest Vision Yet of China’s Ambitious “New Silk Road”, May 9. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com: https//thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-new-silk-road-vision-revealed/
18. V Kaura (2017), Understanding India’s Response to China’s Belt and Road, June 10. Retrieved from http://www.atimes.com and http://www.atimes.com/understanding-indias-response-chinas-obor/
19. Global Insight: China’s One Belt One Road Initiative, March 2016. Retrieved from http://ficci.in/: http://ficci.in/SPdocument/20853/Chinas_One_Belt_One_Road_ Initiative.pdf
20. Sharma (2016), op. cit.
21. R R Chaturvedy (2014), “Neighboring First: Modi’s Foreign Policy Mantra”, ISAS Brief National University of Singapore.
22. S Kumar (2016), India’s National Security: Annual Review 2015-16, Taylor & Francis, New Delhi.
23. Sagar Mala project is a strategic and customer-oriented 8,000,000 million ($120 bn or €110 bn) investment initiative of the Government of India entailing setting up of 6+ mega ports, modernization of several dozen more ports, development of 14+ Coastal Economic Zones and at least 29 Coastal Economic Units.
24. The idea of an Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) emerged in the joint declaration issued by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in November 2016. The AAGC envisages a people-centric sustainable growth strategy, the contours of which would be evolved through a process of detailed consultations across Asia and Africa, engaging various stakeholders—governments, firms, think tanks and civil society.
25. M A Rana (2015), “India’s Neighborhood Policy-Post 2014”, FPRC Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 4-40.
26. S P Sadasiva (2016), Smart Diplomacy: Exploring China-India Synergy, World Scientific, New Delhi.
27. N Mathew (2014), What is the Difference Between India’s “Act East Policy” and “Look East Policy”?, June 2. Retrieved from https://www.quora.com: https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-Indias-Act-East-Policy-and-Look-East-Policy
28. D Pal (2016), Reorienting India’s Foreign Policy: Neighborhood First, January 13. Retrieved from http://nbr.org: http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=643
29. Ministry of External Affairs (2015), “Act East Policy”, Press Information Bureau, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=133837. Retrieved on September 12, 2017.
30. P Singh (2017), “India’s Participation in CPEC: The Ifs and Buts”, IDSA Issue Brief, pp. 1-9.
31. A Palit (2016), “India’s Act East Policy and Implications for Southeast Asia”, Southeast Asian Affairs, pp. 81-91.
32. S Ashok (2016), “Taking Stock of India’s ‘Act East Policy’”, ORF ISSUE BRIEF, May.
33. S Singh (2017), The Great Corridor Game, January 13. Retrieved from ww.newindianexpress.com: http://www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2017/jan/13/the-great-corridor-game-1559010—1.html
34. Ibid.
35. T Kootneeti (2017), Geopolitics of Infrastructure: India’s “Bharatmala & Sagarmala” Vs China’s “Road & Belt”, December 18. Retrieved from http://www.thekootneeti.com: http://www.thekootneeti.com/chinese-obor-sagarmala/
36. I Takalvi (2017), Dear China, India will Never Digest OBOR and CPEC, May 28. Retrieved from https://en.dailypakistan.com.: https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/opinion/dear-china-india-will-never-digest-obor-and-cpec/
37. N Desk (2017), Modi and Abe Plan Asia-Africa Link to Counter China’s OBOR and CPEC, September 15. Retrieved from http://ris.org.in: http://ris.org.in/aagc/sites/default/files/Express%20Tribune-15-09-2017-Modi%20and%20Abe%20plan%20Asia-Africa%20link%20to%20counter% 20China%20s%20 OBOR%20and%20CPEC_0.pdf